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Richard, Thanks for this. I've looked over the list of historians who co-signed the Clinton petition, however, and they are not just \"the usual suspects.\" Stanley Katz, Pauline Meier, ... there are some very heavy hitters there. Surely you no longer believe, as you once may have, that a President should be impeached over the placement of his cigar.
Thanks for this reference, Oscar. As you say, readers will reach different conclusions from it, but it is helpful to know this. I continue to wonder if our policy planners did not think that we simply had to open up Iraqi oil fields to greater access by the West. It was certainly not an explanation for the war which the administration was prepared to acknowledge. If the planners anticipated that Saudi Arabia would increasingly be a less reliable ally in the middle east, that would be another reason why the administration felt obliged to put a regime in place in Iraq with which it could deal.
I qualify as a persistent critic of Bellesiles' Arming America Ouch!! My amour propre is wounded. Rather I would hope to be seen more as a critic of bogus attempts to defend Bellesiles, and bad scholarship by the collectivists. In fact, I can't think of a single piece of original criticism I've provided on Arming America. I just find the whole mess a little ludicrous: the Great Emory Flood of 2 inches, that just happened to catch Bellesiles' \"data\"; the fact that such data were not turned into the recovery specialists at Emory; the quasi-repudiation of e-mails; the \"secret copy\" of LDS microfilm that seems generally available in research libraries; the probate records of East Point that don't exist; the probate records of San Francisco records that don't exist; the partial records at Contra Costa that weren't even available to Bellesiles during his research for AA; the data that were dropped because the state was distributing arms to militia, without an explanation of how the state arms would show up in probate records; etc.In fact, I happen to think there is a coherent, defensible, though not necessarily winning collectivist argument. Madison, during the ratification debates, offered under criticism by Henry, that the states had a concurrent right to arm the militias. Henry quite properly answered that if that were so, the states similarly had a concurrent right organize and officer the militia (a reductio ad absurdum). It seems to me that the Second Amendment can be seen as addressing these criticisms in particular. It could be seen as giving the people, acting through their legislature, the express right to arm the militia, and to use it for state purposes. This would follow a model from the Massachusetts Constitution, which said the people had a right to demand that the preferred church be given state support (leaving to the legislature the exact means and extent) -- this would act as a check on interpretations of religious freedom that would preclude an established church. In the case of the Second Amendment, it places the militia power in the people, the seat of sovereignty, acting through their legislatures, as Madison was anxious to strip the states of the marks of sovereignty.The only problems as I see it with this view are the interlineation problem, and that fact that the only two contemporary commentators on the nature of the right in the Second (whether it be collective or individual) both agree that it is individual, and they hail from opposing camps!! The two were tench Coxe and Sen. Grayson of Virginia.My greatest beef is not with Bellesiles, or with the collectivist interpretation, but with the truly bad arguments put forward for the collectivist view -- the arguments ring of advocacy, not analysis (a sin not unknown to both sides of the issue). I offer an example from Wills' A Necessary Evil (p.30):\"The famed American rifle was not of much use in war, and its wielders, according to historians George Scheer and Hugh Rankin, were 'more noisy than useful.'\"Wills then quotes, in support of his claim, Scheer and Rankin on the disadvantages of the rifle for \"line firing\". The suppressed premiss, apparently, is that all or most war was conducted in \"line firing\" mode. From the disadvantages to line firing, Wills leaps to the conclusion that rifles were not of much use, tout court. That hardly explains why Congress' first order of business was to raise companies of ... you guessed it ... riflemen. Nor does it explain why the Militia Act of 1792 gave militia men the option of owning rifles to satisfy the act.I have other problems with Wills. The right \"to keep\" arms is somehow transmogrified into a right to demand that Congress provide them (apparently, a positive right). The logical gap between \"keep\" and \"provide\" seems to present no barrier to the leaps of Wills. Moreover, the so-called right to be provided with arms is somehow, without argument, then devolved into a mere pledge to provide -- a right being enforceable, a pledge not being legally enforceable. This is all based on the original Constitutional language that gives Congress the power to \"provide for ... arming ...\". Wills apparently thinks that \"provide for\" is synonymous with \"provide\", yet \"provide for\" means simply \"to make legal provision for\", such as when, during the run-up to the War of 1812, Congress authorized the states to arm the militias.Similarly bad arguments abound in the writings of other collectivists. I don't have a complete critique of Bellesiles AA locked in my brain. My main beef is with Wills, Bernstein, Bogus, Rakove, and company, who either so enthusiatically embraced Bellesiles, or continue to defend him on less than complete grounds, or who have done their best to add to the world's store of bad arguments in defense of a collectivist view.
David, I think your point about the department at Michigan is well taken. You've read KC's response to the discussion on the HNN boards, I take it. He notes places in which he would have preferred to give a more nuanced testimony had time allowed. Having said that, his point about certain traditional fields of American history having been shoved to the margins by the race/ class/gender agenda is hard to dispute. Nor is he arguing that those ways of interpreting our past should not be represented -- even in the tradition. They are very important to our constitutional, diplomatic, military, and political history, but they shouldn't be taught to the exclusion of the latter.
I'm glad you felt I was making a useful distinction (if that's the way to describe it). I find your reply helpful, too. It localizes a disconnect between us that has come up in one form or another before. I'll discuss it briefly here because I hope others may find either or both of us easier to understand. It's in the part following 'but' in your message. To me it seems quite possible that such evidence as the written decisions in these court cases provide may be incomplete (if only because judges notoriously pick the narrowest available grounds for a decision), but most unlikely that they would be self-contradictory in a way that really supports opposite interpretations of their meaning. I believe, perhaps naively, that judges try to avoid this. Yet it is commonplace to find such directly conflicting uses of the same material in the secondary literature on the Second Amendment. What I think is going on is that one side more often refers to cases without actually displaying for scrutiny the evidence contained in the written opinion that they view as supportive of their interpretation, and then explaining what makes it so. Many references to US v. Miller 1939 are just like that. They are bare references to the case, like the one I just made. Yet when one reads the case, and the more detailed commentaries on the case, it does say something fairly clearly, though it may be exasperatingly narrow. So, at some point, I feel, the indefinite extension of the benefit of a doubt to these skeletal arguments becomes untenable, and eventually, personally compromising. You and I seem to have quite different tolerances on this. That's information I find useful, and I'll try to apply it in ways that save us time as we correspond in the future.I also strongly suspect that there is something about the stylistic conventions of legal scholarly argumentation that I may need to learn more about, and I would be grateful to any law profs out there for a bit of guidance. Gratis, of course. First visit, you know 59ce067264